through Jehol, increase armaments generally—increase of air force particularly, aid to the volunteers and drastic execution of the boycott of Japanese goods." All of this of course is very interesting, but for the fact that the C. C. E. C. to our knowledge has never adopted any of the measures mentioned above. The Japanese complaint, in other words, is groundless; because it is based entirely on falsehood. To be sure, there is for example a movement on foot among the people to make contributions toward the building up of a Chinese Air Force. But surely such a manifestation of patriotism on the part of the Chinese people is not to be considered a provocation or a cause for alarm. Imagine what the Japanese would say, if the Chinese political authorities should look upon the purchasing of aeroplanes by popular subscription in Japan—which is also a fact—as a sufficient excuse for issuing a statement declaring for a "liquidation" of the Japanese Government!

As for Jehol, perhaps the Japanese have forgotten that it is still Chinese territory. There is nothing to be surprised at that the Chinese Government is sending troops to that province, because the situation there is such that precautionary measures of self-defence have to be taken. Again, it is true that the volunteers have been receiving a lot of help from China proper, but such help, which is largely financial in nature, comes entirely from the people themselves, and not from the government. Finally, the boycott is also a spontaneous expression of disapproval of the Japanese-handed actions in China on the part of the masses in China, and as such, the government has no right to suppress it. In any case, it is wrong to attribute the spread of the movement of boycott to the directing genius of the Kuomintang Government, because the latter has not taken any hand in it.

But the most ridiculous thing about it all is that the Japanese militarists most naively would have the world believe that the Kuomintang Government, in the person of Mr. Sun Fo, is trying to bring about a "second world war." To begin with, even granting that such is the intention of Mr. Sun, we must not fail to remember that he can in no way be identified with the Kuomintang Government per se. He is only one of its leaders and therefore whatever he does, again granting that the Japanese accusation is true, can not be interpreted as being representative of the Kuomintang's consensus of opinion or of its official policy. In reality, however, any body can see that it is not the Chinese but the Japanese themselves who are trying to bring about a second world war. It is the latter who are determined to carry their scheme of world conquest through, and in so trying will ignite the fuse which will result in an explosion which is bound to affect the whole world. To quote the notorious memorial of the late Premier Tanaka: "The way to gain actual rights in Manchuria and Mongolia is to use the region as a base and under the pretense of trade and commerce penetrate the rest of China. . . . . Having China's entire resources at our disposal we shall proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe. But to get control of Manchuria and Mongolia is the first step if the Yamato race wishes to distinguish itself on Continental Asia." Now that the first step in her diabolic scheme has already been taken, the next thing she will do is to push her way southward, which means that before long she will come into conflict not only with England in India but also France in Indo-China and the United States in the Pacific waters. And in such an eventuality, we doubt very much if these latter countries would let Japan go easily without putting up a fight. It would then mean a second world war indeed, but the aggressor in that case would be Japan, and not China.

According to the statement, the true motives of the Kuomintang Government in adopting these alleged measures against Japan are "to fan up strong hostility of the Chinese people against Japan so as to effect a temporary unity of the nation, thereby glossing over the internal state of anarchy in the eyes of the world." The Japanese militarists talk as if they do not wish to see China become a unified nation, and in reality too that is what they have in mind. They view the prospect of a unified China with alarm, because their watchword in China has always been "Divide and Rule." As for saying that China is in a state of internal anarchy, the obvious retort is that for an anarchic state to balance its budget without resorting to foreign loans, as China recently did, must be a feat indeed. Furthermore, that China at the present moment is a unified nation is proved by the fact that the nation is at one in its policy of preparedness against its enemy and of co-operation with its friends. According to the statement, the Kuomintang Government is now trying to "cement relations with Russia and America in pursuit of China's traditional policy of playing off one foreign country against another and of befriending distant nations to attack her neighbors." While such speculations regarding China's diplomatic policy are mere conjectures, we would not at all be surprised that should the League of Nation fail to take measures toward righting our wrong this time, China would be forced, in Minister Quo Tai-chi's words, "to re-orientate our policy" vis-a-vis the Japanese. The age of ententes and alliances is not yet past, as witness the report that Japan herself has only recently entered into a secret pact with France and England. What Japan has done, China can do as well, when she is forced to it. Japan has already unhitched her sword, we might as well get ready for her.

Communism In China

BY LOEW CHUAN-HUA (雷傳華)

A factor that must not be overlooked in studying the economic and social conditions in China is the rapid growth of Communism since 1919. Within a little more than a decade the Communists have elevated themselves from a plane of harmless Marxian theorists into that of a powerful political movement and, for good or for ill, they now command amongst the workers and the peasants an influence that is bound to produce far-reaching effects in the future of China. Since the split between the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party in April, 1927, continuous attempts have been made by the National as well as the provincial authorities to extirpate the so-called Red menace from the political arena; but despite these efforts the Soviets in Southern and Central China remain a vexed question today.

The reason behind this failure is not far to seek. Incessant civil strife, the break-up of the agricultural system, unemployment, increased banditry, natural calamities, and the lack of security in the peaceful pursuits of life—these and a host of other causes have made China a most fertile field for Communist propaganda and agitation. Not until, therefore, the very causes which have precipitated the rise of Communism are removed by efforts of economic reconstruction can one hope for any measurable decline in its influence amongst the masses in China. A brief review of the Communist Party and its social-economic policy is both necessary and helpful to the finding of a just and lasting remedy for the complicated social disorders in this country.

The development of Communism in China may be conveniently divided into three periods: the period of secret organization 1919-23; the period of open expansion and cooperation with the Kuomintang 1924-27, and the period of territorialism since 1927.

During its early stage, Communism was largely a question of academic interest and crept into the minds of the student and intellectual class under the cloak of the literary renaissance and the new-thought movement. Leading Communist writers like Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, former professors of the Peking National University, launched at this time a number of radical magazines to propagate their doctrines, the most notable ones being the Masses, the Pioneer, the Vanguard and La Jeunesse. A few schools were also opened for the deliberate object of promoting the Communist movement in China. The Shanghai University which had played an important role in the May 30th Incident, 1925, and the Franco-Chinese College in Chengu were typical examples.

As early as January, 1919, Chinese workers in Moscow resolved that propagandists should be sent to their homeland. In a message to Canton, they praised Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s untiring struggle against the northern militarists and the foreign imperialists, and urged him Chinese proletariat to ally itself with the Russian. Further interest in Communism as a possible method of national salvation was aroused shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles when M. Leo Karakhian, then assistant commissar for foreign affairs for Soviet Russia, addressed a manifesto to the Chinese in which he indirectly denounced the giving of Shantung to Japan and maintained that “all people should have their independence and self-government and not submit to being bound by other nation.”

Shortly after the Student Movement of 1919, a Society for the study of Marxism was formed by a group of intellectual leaders in Peking, and a Young Socialist League (社會主義青年團) was organized by the radical elements in Shanghai under the alleged direction of a Soviet agent named Voichin-

tionary spirit and a class-struggle among the workers during this period, there was little likelihood of an immediate social revolution. Although Communist literature, translated chiefly from Japanese sources, had been distributed in large quantities and even the death of Lenin was commemorated in the large cities, the overwhelming majority of the proletariat were reluctant to risk their jobs for purely doctrinal reasons. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, too, was not in favor of an immediate adoption of Communism in China. On January 26, 1923, as a result of his conversations with M. Joffre, former Soviet ambassador to China, a joint statement was issued which specifically indicated the Kuomintang leader’s attitude towards Communism. The statement declared inter alia: “Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that Communist or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced in China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by M. Joffre, who is further of opinion that China’s paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain national independence, and regarding this great task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.” (6)

Compared with the drastic practices of the Soviets in Southern and Central China today, the political program of the Communist Party during the first period (when it was dominated by Chen Tu-hsiu, now leader of the Trotskyist faction) was moderate indeed. Advocating the calling of a national congress for solving domestic issues, the Communists declared: “Our opinion is to hold a national congress, composed of delegates of the chambers of commerce, agricultural unions, workers’ unions, students’ unions and other professional unions of the whole nation in a suitable place. This congress should be called by the Kuomintang which has the historical mission of the National Revolution. The new government born out of this national congress with real revolutionary nationalist force will crush the power of the militarists and the foreign imperialists.” (7)

II

With the reorganization of the Kuomintang in January, 1924, Communism acquired a more active tone. Armed with a legal status, the Communists launched a nation-wide scheme of unionization and through the influence of Michael Borodin, many of them were appointed to pivotal positions in the Nationalist Government and the Kuomintang machinery. By May 23, 1925, the Communists had reached the zenith of their power in Southern China, and as a result the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang passed a resolution to the effect that it could no longer cooperate with the Peking Government in the work of the reorganization of China and that the only government of the world with which the Kuomintang could work hand in hand was that of Soviet Russia, which was always in sympathy with the aspirations of the Chinese people.

During the second period, Red labor unions began to grow by leaps and bounds, particularly in Kwangtung province. It is true that as early as May, 1919, Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself had encouraged the formation of labor unions in China and had given an approbation to the well-known Communist labor leader, Tan Ping-san, for conducting propaganda activities and for securing the support of the labor organizations in the Nationalist Revolution, but labor unions could not function freely and did not acquire any centralized leadership until the Communists were admitted into the Kuomintang. The first, second, third and fourth national labor conferences were all convened during the period of open expansion. Radical elements of the Kwangtung General Labor Federation (廣東總工會) withdrew from that organization and formed a Labor Representatives’ Association, while only one-fourth of that number remained as members of the Kwangtung General Labor Federation.

Russian-trained labor organizers such as Lee Lih-san, former chairman of the All-China Labor Federation, and Hsiang Chung-fah, once secretary-general of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, were sent to Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin, Tungchuan and other industrial centers to organize trade unions and “cells”, and to stir up the workers to a sense of the country’s wrongs. There was a marked increase in the number of political strikes, the most famous one being the Hongkong seamen’s strike of 1925-26. Borodin’s work in Canton, though advisory in name, was heartily supported by a number of the Leftist members of the Kuomintang, the most notable person being Liao Chung-kai who was at that time head of the Labor Department of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters. On August 19, 1925, Liao was assassinated by anti-Communists and since then, the Red labor unions have not been able to work openly in Canton.

During the Northern Expedition (1926-27), the Communists enjoyed a rapid growth in power and in number, and in Kiangsi and Hunan provinces they even succeeded tosovietize a number of the country districts. When the Nationalist Government moved from Canton to Wuhan, the Communists obtained a controlling position in it and were able to carry out a number of Communist measures.

The most noteworthy event in the realm of labor during the second period was the calling of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference in Hankow in May, 1927, in which Communists from all the Pacific as well as some of the European countries were represented. The Conference adopted the following significant program for the improvement of labor conditions:

1. Introduction of the eight-hour day;
2. Introduction of a regular continuous forty-two hour weekly rest;
3. Introduction of social insurance in case of illness, accident, incapacitation and unemployment, and the whole burden of such insurance to be borne by the employers and the government;
4. Prohibition of night work for women; eight weeks of paid vacation before and eight weeks after confinement;
5. Absolute prohibition of the sale and purchase of children for purposes of exploitation; prohibition of child labor for all purposes under fourteen years;
6. Equal wages for equal work;
7. Freedom of organization, freedom of assembly, freedom of press and freedom to organize and carry on strikes;

(7) China Year Book, 1924, p. 660.
8. Introduction of a labor inspection whose organs are to be elected by the trade unions;
9. Abolition of corporal punishment, fines, the practice of docking wages or of paying wages with products of the factory stores;
10. Organization of labor pickets for the struggle against Fascism and blacklegging.\(^{(8)}\)

III.

With the eviction of the Communists from the Kuoming-tang in April, 1927, all the Red labor unions in China were dissolved and many of their leaders killed. Over 470 labor organizations in Canton were abolished by an order of the military authorities that spring, while only 30 were left undisturbed. Among the unions which were disbanded or reorganized was the famous Chinese Seamen’s Union, which had been for a long time headed by the Communist leader, Su Chao-jen. In Hongkong the office of the Chinese Seamen’s Union was sealed by the British authorities and an organization of a much milder character was allowed to appear under the name of Chinese Seamen’s Associated Union.

Since its split with the Kuoming-tang, the Communists have resorted to secret and terrorist methods of work. The Communist coup de’tat in Canton on December 11, 1927, the Red uprising in Nanchang on July 30, 1928, and the short-lived Soviet regime in Changsha in the beginning of August, 1930, were all part and parcel of a whole terrorist movement planned by the Communists to conquer Southern and Central China, though a number of their own members were not in entire agreement with these violent tactics and subsequently formed an opposition (the Trotskyists) within the Communist Party.

Since they can no longer conduct their activities openly, the Red labor unions have suffered serious reverses in recent years. The chief points of emphasis in the programs of the Red labor unions, however, may be seen from the following measures adopted at a plenary session of the All-China Labor Federation in February, 1928: (1) to regard the overthrow of Kuoming-tang rule and imperialism as the chief and most urgent task of the Red labor unions in China; (2) to give special attention in organizing the seamen, the miners, the railway workers, the textile workers, the metallic workers, the metallic workers and the industrial workers in such important centers as Shanghai, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Hongkong, Canton and Wuhan; (3) to give more effective direction to the All-China Railway Workers’ Union, the All-China Seamen’s Union, the Shanghai General Labor Federation and the Canton office of the All-China Labor Federation; (4) to participate in the mass movements in Shanghai; (5) to send representatives to direct and intensify the class-struggle in various parts of the country; (6) to organize institutes to train secretaries and special workers for the Red labor unions; (7) to give greater emphasis on propaganda and educational activities; and (8) to study and collect information regarding the economic and labor situation in China. (9)

In November, 1929, the All-China Labor Federation secretly convened the fifth national labor conference in Shanghai. At this Conference resolutions were adopted to cope with the increasing influence of the “Yellow” labor unions and to lay stress on organizing the peasants and artisans in the country districts. In fact, a much greater attention is now given to the making of Communists out of the Chinese peasantry through the redistribution of land, and a stronger emphasis is put on the agrarian revolution than in previous periods.

While very little reliable information is available regarding the actual conditions of the Soviet districts in Southern and Central China today, their socio-economic policy may be seen from the following platform issued in the Red Army Daily, August 2, 1930:

1. To overthrow imperialism;
2. To confiscate all foreign firms and banks;
3. To unify China and to grant the right of self-determination to all the races and tribes in this country;
4. To establish the conference of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ representatives and to set up a Soviet government;
5. To enforce the eight-hour day, to increase wages, to provide relief for the unemployed and to institute social insurance;
6. To confiscate all the holdings of the big landlords for redistribution among the poor and the small peasants;\(^{(10)}\)
7. To improve the livelihood of the soldiers and to provide them with work and land;
8. To abolish all taxes levied by the militarists and to enforce the single-tax system;
9. To co-operate with all the unproportioned classes of the world and Soviet Russia.

The first All-China Soviet Congress was held in southeastern Kiangsi on November 7, 1931, when in conformity with the platform mentioned above, a Provisional Government of the Soviet Republic of China was inaugurated. In the Soviet districts the conditions of the workers and the peasants are reported to have radically improved.\(^{(11)}\) In May, 1930, the Soviet authorities adopted a labor code which provided for the eight-hour day, the fixing of a minimum wage, labor protection for women and juniors, social insurance for workers, and the establishment of trade unions. Wages have been increased, the eight-hour day has been introduced, the contractor’s system abolished (especially in Western Fukien and Southeastern Kiangsi), night work for women and children stopped. Apprentices in the Soviet districts receive wages; the bosses are no longer permitted to do just what they please. The apprenticeship term has been reduced from five or more years to three years; most of the apprentices have freed themselves from the old craft traditions and have organized their own trade unions. Beside, the trade unions are given the right to organize and to declare strikes, to negotiate and conclude agreements with employers, and to share with employers in the running of factories. Members of the Labor Commission of the Provisional Soviet Government and the labor inspectors of the various Soviet districts are directly

\(^{(8)}\) China Year Book 1928, p. 1026.
\(^{(10)}\) It may be noted here that wherever the Red armies went, they destroyed all the landmarks or boundary stones of private properties and burned all the title deeds they could discover.
\(^{(11)}\) From “Eastern and Colonial,” Vol. IV, Nos. 10-11, August-September, 1931.
recommended and nominated by the trade unions. It must be added, however, that this state of affairs in the Soviet districts is frequently affected and sometimes entirely upset by the attacks from the Nationalist forces.

IV.

No accurate information is available regarding the definite size of the Communist Party in China or the extent of its membership amongst the proletariat. It was estimated that at the end of 1927 the Communist Party in China had about 60,000 members. In 1929, this membership had reached a figure of 133,365 according to an article on "The Situation of the Chinese Communist Party", published in Pravda, Moscow, on June 23, that year.

The influence of the Communist Party amongst the rank and file of the working people in China is also difficult to estimate. According to an article entitled "An Analysis of the Strength of the Communist Party in China" in the Kuomintang magazine The Way of Light on April 16, 1931, the total number of industrial workers in China was estimated at 2,750,000. The figure is probably taken from Su Chao-jen's "Report on the Labor Movement in China" given at the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference in 1927, and has most likely decreased during the last few years. Indeed, according to the investigations of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labor in 1930 the number of factory workers in 29 important cities, covering nine provinces of China, was only 1,204,317. The number of handicraft works in China is even more difficult to know. According to the investigations of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce of the former Peking government, there were about 11,960,000 handicraft workers in China. No estimate regarding the handicraft population has been attempted in recent years. If the above estimates are accepted as reasonable conjectures, the total number of industrial and handicraft workers in the whole of China cannot be very far from 15,000,000 and is certainly less than 20,000,000. At the Fifth All-China Labor Conference held in 1929, the Red Labor unions claimed that they had a total membership of 70,000 for all China, three-fifths of which were in Soviet districts and the rest scattered in various "white" territories. At the fifth Red International of Labor Unions congress held in August, 1930, it was reported that the Red trade unions in China had 114,525 members, of which 64,704 were in Soviet regions and 49,821 in "white" territories. In September, 1931, the numerical strength of the Red trade unions in Soviet China increased to 100,000, although that of the Red unions in the "white" territories showed a small decline. (12) Compared with a total proletarian population of approximately 15,000,000 (excluding the peasants), a membership of about 150,000 for the Red labor unions in the whole of China is apparently not an alarming phenomenon.

However, the power of the Communist Party in China goes beyond its numerical strength. Twenty years of domestic warfare, the break-up of the agricultural system, the deplorable working conditions in the cities, the recurrence of natural calamities and famines, the persistent propagation of radicalism among the masses and the growth of a ruling class of militarists, politicians and foreign-educated adventurers who, in the heat of fighting, always appear solicitous of the people's interests but when in power have nothing but their own pockets in view—these are constant sources of fuel to the flame of social revolt in China.

Whether we like it or not, the most alluring feature of the Communists in Southern and Central China today is their policy of agrarian revolution. Because of these efforts in redistributing land, countless farmers have turned Red, even though they may not have the least comprehension of the intricate theories of Karl Marx. Such a radical transformation in land tenure is a most disturbing problem for the present Chinese regime to face. Unless the Kuomintang, which has copiously advocated the doctrine of "enabling the peasant to own the land he tills," makes an equal attempt to improve the status of the Chinese peasantry and carry out certain long overdue reforms, Communism will not likely fade away in the rural districts.

In the spring of 1932, the Communists claimed that they were in control of 60,000 square miles of Chinese territory, possessed a well-equipped army of 150,000 to 200,000 fighters and had 30,000,000 to 50,000,000 civilians under their jurisdiction. (13) Although the four-month military campaign carried out by the National Government last summer has considerably reduced the Soviet sphere of influence in Central China, optimism regarding the future developments is not yet discernible. The Communist Party in China, indeed, may suffer from military defeats now and then; it may be condemned for its violent tactics. But its socio-economic message will always be a rosy appeal to the masses. Whether or not it is to become the master of all China largely depends upon how much the present leadership will try to gratify the needs of the common people and rebuild the existing social order on a new basis on justice and equality.

Thomas Burke, J.O.P. Bland And Frederick Moore

By O. D. RASMUSSEN


1. Thomas Burke Recants. Limehouse, London's ''Chinatown," has now passed into the relics of the Western mumble-jumble of stupid dramatic fiction, along with San Francisco's Chinatown, and other fond idols of best-selling novelists. Recently, the Police Commissioner of San Francisco blew up the ancient fable by asserting that if all the white residents of his city were as well behaved as the Chinese his task would far easier than it is.

Now comes Thomas Burke, author of "Limehouse Nights," with a recantation in book form called "The Real East End," (Constable, 8/6), in which he says:

"I admit to using the East End for my own purposes, and dramatising it to what I wanted it to be, as many