speed, followed by the mob. Sticks, chairs, bricks, and what not were thrown at Bellemry, who was hit and got out of the risha at the Young Allen Court. With difficulty, he managed to reach the Minhong Road police station. Then Sergeant Ferguson arrived and was mobbed; he was hit and his coat and shirt were torn. The foreign police tried to pull him into the station, but a Japanese naval officer was pulling in the opposite direction and was seen to be blundering his big sword. Ferguson, however, finally managed to get in. A Japanese naval officer spoke to the mob who cheered him lustily, and in split-second Hale, a foreign policeman, was disarmed. Hatless with disheveled hair, with his coat torn and his mouth bleeding he ran into the station.

So the episode closed. Everybody's eye is on the Shanghai Municipal Council, but the high officials of the Council seem to be quite willing to swallow the insult and are maintaining a sort of "dignified silence." In their own eyes the silence may be dignified, but in the eyes of the public, the attitude of the Council seems to confirm the theory that westerners can understand but one language—force. Else why the order "shoot to kill" was given when a peaceful group of Chinese confronted the Louss police station causing the now well-known May 30th Incident, and no such order was given when police officers were manhandled by an unruly Japanese mob in the manner described above? Yes, the public is inclined to regard the Council as prostrate before the Japanese.

However, such loss of face by the Council is a logical consequence of its past acts. Since the Nanking Road tragedy, may even before, the Council has ever been solicitous to please the Japanese, who have now become the "spoiled child" in the settlement. With a slap on the Council's face, they now say that it is up to the Council to make the next move.

If the Council let them go scot free for such unwarranted assaults upon its police officers, what might they do next? And what if groups of other nationalities should follow suit and defy the authority of the Council? What would become of the personal safety of the less belligerent residents of the settlement?

All the eyes are turned upon the Council; let it behave like a man, not like a bully—defiant toward the weak and prostrate before the strong.

The Rule Of Dictatorship

China's political evolution has been a laborious one. From the abortive attempt at a constitutional monarchy by Emperor Kuang-hsu, the illustrious predecessor to the ignominious Henry Fu-Yi, she has willingly submitted herself to a series of highly diversified experiments. Between the first provisional government at Nanking of which Dr. Sun Yat-sen was the president and the present nationalist government of which General Chiang Kai-shek is the virtual ruler, there have been one dictatorship under Yuan Shih-kai, two monarchical fiascos under Yang Tu and Chang Hsun, innumerable minor dictatorships under military chieftains of all shades, a communist regime at Hankow and one political tutelage under the Kuomintang. During the same period there have been civil wars without number, coups of all sorts, alliances without rhyme or reason and the loss of four provinces without the slightest display of resistance.

The net result of China's 20 years' venture in democracy seems to be in inverse ratio to the zeal with which the nation has awaited a new dawn. It may be even admitted that China is hardly better off today than at the close of the last century, and it is this superficial phenomenon which has provided confirmed pessimists with an unending source of ammunition for relentless attack on this country. And yet, in all candidness it must be observed that with each failure in some phase of the experiment in democracy there has developed a new impetus to forge ahead, a new determination to succeed. The development of highway and aviation facilities is but one eloquent testimony to the silent resolve for a rebirth, and the complacency of the Canton clique in national affairs, in spite of its occasional outbursts of patriotic fustian, seems to indicate a genuine consciousness of national unity as a condition precedent to national strength.

It appears evident, therefore, that in the failures of the successive regimes may perhaps be discerned a disguised blessing. A nation cannot achieve political greatness without conscientious efforts, and each effort that has fallen short of its goal cannot but make a people wiser politically. For this reason, if for no other, we may welcome the opportunity of discussing the latest fad in government, that of dictatorship.

On this vast subject opinions are bound to differ. In this issue are presented the views of two outstanding Chinese critics and those of a foreign observer of long standing in this country. For our part we are receptive to any principle which works for the best interest of the country. Whether by dictatorship may be evolved a united and strong nation is highly problematical, and no living human being can venture a prophecy with any degree of certainty. The test of the pudding is, after all, in the eating.

On one point, however, there can be no difference of opinion, and that is the equality of all before the law. Traditionally the Chinese people have been democratic in spirit irrespective of the form of government. Any rule which tends to encourage class distinction, religious anti-pancy or political factionism will be so alien to the country that it will be foredoomed to failure. If dictatorship to be adopted for China should take on the complexion of Hitlerism and stand for racial cleavages, then we may emphatically declare that it is not wanted. The Chinese republic is a nation composite of five races each one of which is just as essential to our national existence as another. There must be no distinction.

The political rights of the people, too, may now be
abridged on account of non-allegiance to the ruling party. The equality of opportunity must be co-existent and co-extensive with the equality of opportunity. The affiliation with a political party should be deemed as a privilege to serve the nation and not as a right to demand preference in political appointments for which only merit should be the main consideration and guide.

The popular consent to a dictatorship, moreover, is not to be accepted as a willingness to submit to an iron rule without qualification. It does not imply a supine attitude toward an imposition of a government policy which is designed to infringe upon the rudimentary rights of an average citizen. Dictatorship must in fact be looked upon as a mode of government which is far from being infallible and which consequently must yield to candid criticisms and be sensitive to public wishes. Dictatorship may stand for centralization, but it is by no means omnipotent. It may represent the will of the people but it cannot force its own upon them. Here one may pertinently invoke the classical maxim that "Heaven sees through the people and hears through the people," and it follows that a dictator as a benevolent ruler can claim no greater divine right.

If these simple rules of government are faithfully observed, one would neither object to the rule of a dictator nor doubt its chance of success. And if these selfsame rules are observed, any government will succeed even without a dictator.

Dictatorship vs. Democracy*

I. For Dictatorships

By CHIANG TING-FU (蔣廷黻)

Our country presents today—and indeed in the near future as well—a sorry spectacle, and we may not inappropriately quote the recent utterance of Mr. Hu Han-min “in the past two years the government has not done one thing worthy of praise.” However, Mr. Hu is not quite fair, for the government did do many good things, only these are far outweighed by its faults. Further, this criticism may be levelled not only at the present government, in the last two years, but at the various administrations in the past two decades too. Since the establishment of the republic, the central government has always spent most of its financial resources for the upkeep of troops so as to maintain itself in power, hence it has not been able to carry out various desirable works, even if it should desire to do so. The situation was such that neither Yuan Shih-kai, nor Tuan Chi-jui, nor Wu Pei-fu, nor Chang Tso-lin could do anything, and the present government faces a similar situation.

Shall we have another revolution then? If not, then our talk, no matter how reasonable and sound, will lead us nowhere, because the government will simply pay no attention to what we say. If we should answer the question in the affirmative, let us pause for a moment and consider what our revolutions in the past have led us to, before we plunge headlong into another revolutionary campaign. Once in the field, we are bound to spend most of our energy and resources in fighting our opponents. Even if we should succeed in getting a foothold in one corner of the country, we shall have to maintain (and even increase if that is possible) an army, or we perish. This means that we have to tax the people under our rule to the limit and postpone what is good for them to a later date. And we have to take in allies too, if we are fortunate enough to find them. If we are successful in this respect, we shall soon find that the greater part of our “revolutionary army,” no longer “revolutionary,” and there will be mad scrambles for power and positions. In a word, the people will pay for the cost, but will not reap the benefit of our revolution.

And what a cost too! We tremble to think of it. Besides the loss of lives and property directly sustained by the people, there will be the bid for foreign help. Even Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whose purity of purpose is above suspicion, could not withstand the temptation of making a bid for foreign assistance. In his letter to Baron Okuma, dated May 11, 1914, he appealed to the Japanese statesman for help so that both the Chinese people and government may become friendly to Japan, and that “we may throw the entire China market open to Japanese industrialists and businessmen who will enjoy virtually monopolistic privileges...” For “when China regains her tariff autonomy, a customs union shall be formed with Japan, and Japanese manufactured articles will come to China duty free, and so too will Chinese raw materials go to Japan.” In another part of this letter Dr. Sun actually tried to show that Yuan Shih-kai was not sincere in his dealing with the Japanese. If Dr. Sun could stoop so low, what about others of more questionable integrity? And what is more, those in power were no less guilty. On August 18, 1914, Sun Pao-chi, the then minister of foreign affairs, sent to Lu Chung-yi, Chinese Minister at Tokyo, a cablegram, which said: inter alia, that “our government is trying to avoid any misunderstanding between Japan and China on some fundamental issues and also planning for an economic union” between the two countries. Four days later came this reply: “Please inform the president that Mr. Obata verbally informed me that Japanese government truly has the intention to stop the peace-disturbers. He also said that if China desires to see this intention translated into action, we have to state our terms. These terms must be advantageous to the Japanese so that we may deal with them effectively.”

The end of such a race, if continued long enough, is clear to every one. Even assuming the purity of purpose...