

Gaimusho ordered the families of the staff of the Japanese embassy in Nanking to evacuate.

On July 22, the garrison posts of Peiping were taken over from the 37th division by the 132nd division. But the Japanese forces, instead of withdrawing to Fengtai according to the July 19 agreement, were reinforced by heavy field guns and allegedly also by a chemical corps.

On July 23, Chinese troops continued to withdraw, but the Japanese military in Peiping declared that the time had not yet arrived for the Japanese to do likewise at Lukouchiao, and Japanese military planes continued to fly over Peiping, Paoting, Kaifeng, and Chengchow.

On July 24, Japanese forces, far from withdrawing, strengthened their positions at Lukouchiao and Wanping.

On July 25, a detachment of Japanese units reached Langfang, halfway between Tientsin and Peiping, and came

into conflict with the Chinese garrisons there. Three Japanese transports arrived at Tangku fully loaded with war supplies.

On July 26, the Japanese, assisted by their planes which bombed the Chinese forces in Langfang, occupied their barracks. Kwanganmen, one of Peiping's gates, was attacked by Japanese forces; Nanyuan, by Japanese plainclothes men and bombed by six Japanese planes; and so General Sung Cheh-yuan, seeing that the Japanese had no intention to live up to the terms of their agreement, issued orders to his troops to resist further Japanese encroachment.

On July 27, Japanese troops attacked Tunghsien, Peiping, Hsiyuan, Peiyuan and Nanyuan.

On July 29, Japanese attacked Tientsin.

Can there be any doubt as to who had provoked the fighting in North China?

## China On Her Own

By RANDALL GOULD

**F**OREIGN friends of China who have been watching North China developments in alarm, excitement and often anger, feel sympathy for China and believe that large-scale hostilities must inevitably drag in other countries sooner or later. They feel and say that "something should be done"—usually failing to specify just what.

It would be pleasant to be able to give assurance that the undeniably important international aspects of this trouble meant early and direct international action of some description, designed to bring sanity into as mad a state of affairs as could well be imagined, where one nation rushes thousands of troops upon the soil of another to "defend" herself!

But candor compels even the most sympathetic of foreign friends to concur in a view which has already been reached, and to a great degree acted on, by leading Chinese. This view is that China must rely on—China.

While the weight of world opinion has important bearing, and while the League of Nations has a useful function in helping world opinion come to a focus and afford a sounding-board for a concerted voice, others can at this juncture do relatively little. It is a state of affairs where not China alone, but any nation similarly circumstanced, must rely primarily upon herself.

If these seem hard-hearted or a disclosure of international anarchy at first glance, bear in mind other factors—that neither China nor Japan would care to let any and every nation wade into their argument and take strong action according to its own lights if those lights did not appeal to those concerned. Secretary Hull pointed the moral of this in Washington the other day when in reply to questions he said that the United States was not yet considering mediation since it was requisite in such cases that the two countries involved in controversy should agree to a mediation solution and should make a request to a neutral country to act in that capacity. Of course this and such other matters as possible invocation of the Nine-Power Pact are possible, even probable; but at the outset and for the moment China cannot avoid the necessity for making fateful decisions on her own. Part of this is im-

plicit in the very nature of the case, and true for any period; part, again, is due to the present troubled world situation.

The well known war correspondent Webb Miller recently published a book entitled "I Found No Peace," in which he takes perhaps an over-pessimistic attitude toward the world in general. Of Europe he writes: "The only thing in the European situation that I feel absolutely certain about in my own mind is that another great war cannot be avoided."

And he goes on, with obvious truth: "None of the masses of people want it. They seem like a person afflicted with vertigo who casts himself from a high place to destruction despite his will to live. Which nations will be in the war, when it will start, where and why, I cannot guess; neither can the rulers nor peoples. But they, also, know it is coming and are frantically preparing for it."

Behind this state of mind Mr. Miller sees the whole edifice erected to maintain peace after the World War undermined.

"All of it is tottering," he declares, "and sections of it have crashed in ruins. The League of Nations failed lamentably in the four vital tests which it faced: disarmament, revision of the Treaty of Versailles, Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and Italian aggression in Ethiopia. The Locarno Treaty, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the pacts outlawing war, the limitation-of-armaments treaties, and the network of treaties of friendship and arbitration have all been vitiated by violations and defections. Nations no longer place any confidence in written instruments but put their trust only in instruments of slaughter and military alliances for war. I have watched Europe slump back into a situation far more critical than that of 1914, or any other period of history...."

Mr. Miller takes an extreme, though currently popular, position. My personal feeling is more moderate, but I have not seen as much as has Mr. Miller; at any rate I believe he errs (with the general public) in blaming the League too much for things which the League clearly enough could not help, lacking "teeth." The League certainly can assemble and formulate international feeling, and in the long run exercise formidable pressure, but in dealing with a sudden clean-cut case of burglary it does not have the instruments of forceful control nor has it ever

had them. Which by no means says that it is either dead or dying, or yet that it is to be ruled out of consideration in our present North China crisis.

So much for Europe. The United States is traditionally the great friend of China. It has not ceased to be such although even the best of friends cannot step in single-handed, striding across the world's greatest sea, to embark upon a war not its own in any respect. Efforts have been made through such channels as could be employed and China is familiar with the history of America's position during the Manchuria adventure through the pages of Colonel Henry L. Stimson's "The Far Eastern Crisis"—a volume which points out, among other things, that though "the future of China is one of the great problems of the ages" still "one thing is clear—she must develop in her own way."

That is a remark which can receive several readings. What Colonel Stimson meant was that, as he subsequently put it, "she cannot be dominated or driven by outside force into an alien or undesired form of evolution"—which of course has no immediate bearing on an essentially military problem, but which sheds light on the essential senselessness of any country's thinking it can submerge, by force or otherwise, this lad of forty centuries' history.

Apropos of Japan's frequent claim to be the great stabilizing force of Asia, it is a temptation to divert from the main theme for a moment to quote Colonel Stimson a word or two further when he remarks that China has "the most persistent national culture in the world" whose "essentially peaceful character . . . is now the main stabilizing factor of Asia. Its loss would be a blow which would directly affect the peace of her neighbors, including America." From that point of view it is regarded as unfortunate that China should have been forced to undergo an intensive process of modern militarization; yet the general international situation, emphasizing the old sayings "God helps them who help themselves" and "God is on the side of the strongest battalions," has left China no alternative.

Surveying the world as a whole, we find Europe in a state of extreme tension with chief focus of interest necessarily on the Spanish international battleground; Russia with potential troubles both west and east, and plenty of internal excitement at the same time; and the United States concerned over both Europe and the Far East, but probably even more concerned over such domestic difficulties as the strike epidemic. In other words, trouble everywhere and no need to import any from China. Sympathy, yes; help, no. It is too bad, but on the other hand would China be much more happy if she found herself the recipient of such a variety of attention as is the case in Spain?

For make no mistake, China is by no means in the worst possible position when she is told she must look to herself for salvation. It would be much more complex if a number of others were straining at the leash, ready to jump into the arena in her behalf—or against her. And there might be some drastic and dismaying surprises if any such clear international line-up had to come, for China's own position in the matter might become only a minor part

of the whole affair and a few of China's apparent friends and helpers might, for reasons stretching far afield into their own political set-ups, prove to be on the other side of the fence in the last analysis.

It is very doubtful whether any country profits, in the long run, by much pampering at the hands of other countries. In China's own record it is possible that at certain phases of development the Chinese were actually weakened by a belief that they could get along by playing one nation against another, or by appealing for help from everybody. That is a sort of thing begging the main issue, which is that the nation like the individual must in the final analysis stand on its own feet. The realization of this fact by such men as General Chiang Kai-shek is the thing which has started China well along the road to being a genuinely—not Westernized, but modern Power.

China has suffered some severe bumps in getting on this road. One of the worst of these was the Manchurian affair. China learned a great deal from that, naturally; but the experience though costly was valuable. Another was the Shanghai "war" of 1932. China learned from that too—chiefly that the Japanese were not super-human or unbeatable—but this time the outside world, already suffering from shell-shock on the Manchurian matter, learned too. International opinion on Far Eastern matter can never be the same since that Shanghai warfare and in my opinion the world's current view is profoundly influenced by the shift in popular opinion at that time.

The Manchurian situation was extremely complicated, and very remote. Japan had effective things to say about Chinese misgovernment in Manchuria, and by and large the issues were tangled. Shanghai was a different matter. Though still geographically remote, the Shanghai fighting was brought near to every Western breakfast and dinner-table by dispatches sent by people who were right in the midst of the whole affair and able to describe both its horrors and its incredibilities first-hand. It was obvious just how without excuse, how senseless, the Shanghai warfare was from the beginning. It was obvious that helpless, inoffensive civilian populations in Chapei and elsewhere were air-bombed without reason or profit. It was obvious that Japan had arrogantly gotten into a mess she was too stubborn to back out of, and likewise obvious that Chinese troops were real fighters if given any sort of leadership, even when their equipment was inferior.

All in all, the Shanghai war made a most profound and lasting impression on world thought, realigning it on the side of China as nothing had done before. That is not to say it was against Japan. But Japan's pious protestations were thereafter subjected to a trifle more than the proverbial grain of salt, and today there is genuine alarm over Japan's attitude toward both China and Soviet Russia despite the fact that Russia is far from generally beloved.

All this may well play a part in subsequent chapters of the drama. But China, unfortunately or fortunately as the case may be, must bear the first shock; the decisions, and the battle if need be. In many ways this may be a good thing for China, and not the least in that it gives a wholesome sense of responsibility which should make every act considered and premeditated.

International feeling certainly does not intend to see China given an unfair deal, if anything can be done to level the balance. It is unlucky that the world is so pre-occupied with all its varied troubles elsewhere that it cannot push ahead on the work of assembling collective forces to see to it that fair deals are always given. When civilization becomes a fact rather than a mere twelve-letter word, and when nations are made to conduct their affairs ac-

cording to something the same law as individuals, the test will no longer be that of brute strength. As matters stand, however involved the world may be in a Far Eastern war, it is the way of that world to let the war start first and to try to do something effective later. Perhaps Shaw was right in his speculation that other planets may use this one as a lunatic asylum!

## Lukouchiao—Before and After

By K. S. MA (馬國驥)

IT is said that there are two most prominent danger spots in the world, one in Europe and the other in the Pacific; and though the problems of the one have little in common with those of the other except on certain general principles, they are, however, both capable of developing into a world war, and any great commotion in one tends to produce serious repercussions in the other. The distressing consequences of such eventualities and the memories of 1914-18 have made the world abhorrent to any major conflict. In the countries bordering on the Pacific, as in European countries, there is a genuine and prevalent desire for peace, and the peace of the Pacific depends to a considerable degree on the relations between China and Japan. Realizing the supreme importance of adjusting these relations, the two countries have tried once and again to devise some acceptable formulae for the solution of their various outstanding problems, and, unfortunately, the more they try to reconcile, the more they find that they cannot reconcile. The intermittent parleys conducted between Nanking and Tokyo have only revealed the difficulties of the task. The plain truth of the matter is that while China tries to preserve her rights and heritage, Japan persists in her expansionist policy, so that even if adjustment should prove possible, its duration and effectiveness would practically depend on the goodwill of Japan, and from past experiences such agreement not only restricts the action of one party only as the other party can always find some pretense when it suits her to contravene its terms, but it also serves the purpose of giving effect to those claims the validity of which is in doubt, and thus it clears the ground for further aggression. In these circumstances, it would not be difficult to see how by such gradual corrosion the very vitals of China's national life would before long be affected.

China's policy towards Japan is what any other country would pursue if similarly situated, namely, peace and self-preservation. The manifesto of the Third Plenary Session of the C.E.C. (February, 1937) and Dr. Wang Chung-hui's statement made public on his assumption of office (March, 1937) and his answers to the questions put to him by Japanese journalists in an interview with him all lay stress on the point that China, while defending the integrity of her territorial and sovereign rights, looks to an understanding with Japan on the basis of equality and reciprocity so that both may be benefited by it; and this attitude is traditional and in keeping with Confucian philosophy on which China's national psychology is still consciously or unconsciously based. As respects the main-

tenance of territorial and administrative integrity and the safeguarding of sovereign rights and vital interests, it is a duty the neglect of which will expose those responsible as well as the people to the severest condemnation. It is what a government and its defence forces are fundamentally for.

That the crux of Sino-Japanese amity hinges on the attitude of Japan is what every one can see. The obstacle in the way is the imperialistic ambition. As long as a nation seeks the gratification of this ambition at the expenses of a neighboring nation, no real and lasting friendship between them can be cultivated. The success of the Buenos Aires conference was due to the goodwill and mutual sympathy pervading in the participating countries, and this change of attitude from mutual suspicion and distrust into mutual assistance and mutual reliance was attributable mainly to the broad and liberal attitude of the leaders of the principal American countries who could think and act reasonably and without recourse to imperialistic means. There must be in Japan also such persons whose range of view extends beyond war trenches and who can see that mutual benefit and mutual sympathy make the best policy for any country in the long run. Machiavellian theories and policy might do a country good if the conditions of the world had remained the same as they were in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, or Nineteenth century; but in a world which moves rapidly in the direction of political and economic nationalism and with the masses playing a more and more important rôle in the nation's social structure, it is extremely doubtful whether a country bent on conquest and aggrandizement will be able to work out its destiny, and even if it succeeds, the difficulties it will encounter will open its eyes to the mistake it will have made, and who knows how long it will be able to hold on.

Unfortunately the power in control in Japan today is a military party imbued with a war psychology. To trace Japan's relations with China since the Sino-Japanese war, 1894-5, is to go over the history of her persistent and incessant encroachment on China. I am not going to review the course of events which by degrees have tightened her grip on China, as they are too recent and too vivid to slip out of memory. Concerning her Manchurian adventure, Mr. Stimson's book on the Far Eastern Crisis and the Lytton Report furnish the most valuable information; and as to the events following that adventure, a very ably composed brochure by Mr. Hsu of the Council of International Affairs, Nanking, has clarified many points hitherto little