Japan’s Provocative Acts

THE Lukouchiao incident has developed into serious proportions and at the time of writing war in everything but name exists in North China. Let us review the facts in the past few weeks to see what has led to such a situation.

The incident originated, it will be recalled, when a Japanese soldier was missed following night manoeuvres, though he was found on the next day according to Chinese report. With the Miyazaki and the Kuramoto cases before us, there seems to be strong reason to believe in the Chinese report, and the incident may be said to have started from nothing—i.e., nothing but the Japanese’ eagerness to provoke war.

Following the outbreak of the incident, both the Japanese military in North China, Manchuria and Korea, and the Japanese government in Tokyo did everything in their power to aggravate the situation, as the following facts clearly show.

On July 8, the day following the incident, while negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the case were progressing, 12 Japanese tanks, 8 field guns and a detachment of troops in war-kit left Tientsin to reinforce Japanese forces in Fengtai.

On July 9, both Chinese and Japanese agreed to evacuate their troops in the vicinity of Wanping and Lukouchiao, but on the same day Tokyo was denouncing the Chinese as “showing a total lack of sincerity”, and the Japanese navy ministry was instructing its 3rd fleet, stationed in Chinese waters, “to stand by for eventualities”.

In the night of July 10, Japanese once more launched an attack on the Chinese who had already partly withdrawn from their former positions.

On July 11, the Japanese alleged that the Chinese had accepted a number of Japanese demands, though what these demands were the Japanese themselves could not agree. Chinese authorities in Peiping denied that there was any agreement beyond that of unconditional simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops. The Japanese allegation of the agreement notwithstanding, units of the Japanese Kwantung army in six trainloads began to arrive in Hopei from beyond the Great Wall, 12 big-model warplanes also belonging to the Kwantung army arrived at Tientsin, and 200 to 300 Japanese soldiers arrived at Fengtai. After a Japanese cabinet’s emergency meeting, the Tokyo foreign office ordered Japanese residents in China to prepare for evacuation. Japanese military planes flew over Tientsin and Peiping as a demonstration. Japanese forces again attacked Chinese positions in Wanping vicinity and Nanyuan.

On July 12, more Kwantung army units reached Tientsin, and the Tientsin Central Railway Station was seized by the Japanese. More warplanes arrived in Peiping, and also 8 armored trains filled with soldiers. Five hundred Japanese soldiers from Chingshi, capital of Jehol, occupied Kupeikou on the Great Wall. General Sung Cheh-yuan arrived in Tientsin to negotiate with the Japanese.

On July 13, Japanese attack on Chinese positions continued and Japanese planes bombarded Nanyuan. Their units also attacked Yungtingmen, one of the gates of Peiping. More Japanese reinforcements arrived in Tientsin, where the East Railway Station, too, was seized by them. The Kwantung army’s spokesman declared in Changchun that it had taken all necessary steps to back the Japanese army in North China.

On July 14, while negotiations were going on in Tientsin, 3000 soldiers arrived at Fengtai from Tientsin to reinforce the Japanese troops there, and Japanese cavalry units attacked Nanyuan. Yangchun and Lofa were also attacked. Japanese military planes continued to fly over Peiping and Tientsin.

On July 15, while the commander of Japanese forces in North China was negotiating with General Sung Cheh-yuan, Tokyo decided to dispatch 100,000 troops from Japan proper, and Japanese steamers plying along China coast were ordered back to Japan to be used as military transports.

On July 16, over 30 Japanese warplanes reached Tung-hsien, and approximately 10,000 Japanese and “Manchuko” troops, at Kupeikou.

On July 17, some 900 Japanese troops arrived at Tungs-hsien, east of Peiping, having disarmed over 30 peace preservation corps men at Anpingchen on the way, while the West Railway Station in Tientsin was occupied by the Japanese. This while negotiations were going on.

On July 18, prospects for peaceful settlement of the case were said to be bright, but from Korea over 10,000 soldiers with heavy war supplies were sent to reinforce the Japanese forces in North China, and Japanese military planes machine-gunned Chinese trains at Changhochia, Honan, and Kwanchuentien and Yuan Sanchezien, Hopei, as well as a village in southern Hopei. Kaoliying, north of Peiping, was occupied by Japanese forces.

On July 19, with General Sung Cheh-yuan’s arrival at Peiping, the city gates were opened and barricades removed. According to the Japanese, he had reached an agreement with them. But Japanese plainclothes men tried to create disturbances on the western outskirts of Peiping, and Japanese regulars attacked Chinese soldiers at Tachingchun. The Japanese military also set up censorship in the Tientsin Chinese Post Office and arrested many Chinese students, lawyers, laborers and the Tientsin correspondent of The Shoo Pao. China replied to Japan’s virtual ultimatum proposing that a date be fixed for the simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops. Japanese soldiers kept firing at the Chinese, while their military headquarters in Tientsin threatened “free action” if Chinese troops did not cease firing back by July 20 at noon.

On July 20, Japanese troops, supported by tanks and field guns, once more attacked Chinese defenders at Lukouchiao and Wanping.

On July 21, Chinese force withdrew from the outposts which were taken over by the Chinese peace preservation corps, with the Japanese firing at the withdrawing Chinese. More reinforcements from Shanhaikwan arrived at the Tientsin East Railway Station, and over 10 Japanese planes flew low over Peiping. The evacuation of Japanese residents from China proceeded to such a stage that the Tokyo
Gaimusho ordered the families of the staff of the Japanese embassy in Nanking to evacuate.

On July 22, the garrison posts of Peiping were taken over from the 37th division by the 132nd division. But the Japanese forces, instead of withdrawing to Fengtai according to the July 19 agreement, were reinforced by heavy field guns and allegedly also by a chemical corps.

On July 23, Chinese troops continued to withdraw, but the Japanese military in Peiping declared that the time had not yet arrived for the Japanese to do likewise at Lukouchiao, and Japanese military planes continued to fly over Peiping, Paoting, Kaifeng, and Chengchow.

On July 24, Japanese forces, far from withdrawing, strengthened their positions at Lukouchiao and Weipings.

On July 25, a detachment of Japanese units reached Langfang, halfway between Tientsin and Peiping, and came into conflict with the Chinese garrisons there. Three Japanese transports arrived at Tangku fully loaded with war supplies.

On July 26, the Japanese, assisted by their planes which bombed the Chinese forces in Langfang, occupied their barracks. Kwangannen, one of Peiping's gates, was attacked by Japanese forces; Nanyuan, by Japanese plainclothesmen and bombed by six Japanese planes; and so General Sung Cheh-yuan, seeing that the Japanese had no intention to live up to the terms of their agreement, issued orders to his troops to resist further Japanese encroachment.


On July 29, Japanese attacked Tientsin.

Can there be any doubt as to who had provoked the fighting in North China?

**China On Her Own**

**By RANDALL GOULD**

FOREIGN friends of China who have been watching North China developments in alarm, excitement and often anger, feel sympathy for China and believe that large-scale hostilities must inevitably drag in other countries sooner or later. They feel and say that "something should be done"—usually failing to specify just what.

It would be pleasant to be able to give assurance that the undeniably important international aspects of this trouble meant early and direct international action of some description, designed to bring sanity into as mad a state of affairs as could well be imagined, where one nation rushes thousands of troops upon the soil of another to "defend" herself!

But candor compels even the most sympathetic of foreign friends to concur in a view which has already been reached, and to a great degree acted on, by leading Chinese. This view is that China must rely on—China.

While the weight of world opinion has important bearing, and while the League of Nations has a useful function in helping world opinion come to a focus and afford a sounding-board for a concerted voice, others can at this juncture do relatively little. It is a state of affairs where not China alone, but any nation similarly circumstanced, must rely primarily upon herself.

If these seem hard-hearted or a disclosure of international anarchy at first glance, bear in mind other factors—that neither China nor Japan would care to let any and every nation wade into their argument and take strong action according to its own lights if those lights did not appeal to those concerned. Secretary Hull pointed the moral of this in Washington the other day when in reply to questions he said that the United States was not yet considering mediation since it was requisite in such cases that the two countries involved in controversy should agree to a mediation solution and should make a request to a neutral country to act in that capacity. Of course this and such other matters as possible invocation of the Nine-Power Pact are possible, even probable; but at the outset and for the moment China cannot avoid the necessity for making fateful decisions on her own. Part of this is implicit in the very nature of the case, and true for any period; part, again, is due to the present troubled world situation.

The well known war correspondent Webb Miller recently published a book entitled "I Found No Peace," in which he takes perhaps an over-pessimistic attitude toward the world in general. Of Europe he writes: "The only thing in the European situation that I feel absolutely certain in my own mind is that another great war cannot be avoided."

And he goes on, with obvious truth: "None of the masses of people want it. They seem like a person afflicted with vertigo who casts himself from a high place to destruction despite his will to live. Which nations will be in the war, when it will start, where and why, I cannot guess; neither can the rulers nor peoples. But they, also, know it is coming and are frantically preparing for it."

Behind this state of mind Mr. Miller sees the whole edifice erected to maintain peace after the World War undermined.

"All of it is tottering," he declares, "and sections of it have crashed in ruins. The League of Nations failed lamentably in the four vital tests which it faced: disarmament, revision of the Treaty of Versailles, Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and Italian aggression in Ethiopia. The Locarno Treaty, the Kellogg-Briand Pacts, the pacts outlawing war, the limitation-of-armaments treaties, and the network of treaties of friendship and arbitration have all been vitiated by violations and deflections. Nations no longer place any confidence in written instruments—but put their trust only in instruments of slaughter and military alliances for war. I have watched Europe slump back into a situation far more critical than that of 1914, or any other period of history . . . ."

Mr. Miller takes an extreme, though currently popular, position. My personal feeling is more moderate, but I have not seen as much as Mr. Miller; at any rate I believe he errs (with the general public) in blaming the League too much for things which the League clearly enough could not help, lacking "teeth." The League certainly can assemble and formulate international feeling, and in the long run exercise formidable pressure, but in dealing with a sudden clean-cut case of burglary it does not have the instruments of forceful control nor has it ever