the Ching dynasty proved their loyalty by anything better than furnishing a few laughing-stocks to the people.

Our provincialism is a product of our laissez faire policy in the past. Edmund Burke said that in order to make people patriotic, the statesmen must make the country lovable. Are we then to conclude that England of the 18th century is not a national state?

The view held by Mr. Chiang that our absolute monarchy failed leave us the legacy of a nucleus to form the new regime, can be historically explained too. The European countries have but recently emerged from their feudalism and they have therefore a relatively fixed ruling class; but our feudalism passed away thousands of years ago, and with the abolition of the competitive examination the literati class lost its importance in our society.

Finally, the backwardness of our "material civilization" is due to our lack of knowledge of science and technology, lack of engineers and technical experts, to our social inertia, etc. All these have no bearing upon the question whether or not we are a national state and can by no stretch of imagination prove that we need a despotic government.

3. Must We Pass Through a Stage of Benevolent Despotism Before We Can Have Our National Reconstruction?—This is, by no means, a new question, as passages from The Hsin Min Pao and The Min Pao, edited respectively by Liang Chi-chao and Wang Ching-wei, clearly show that our Royalists and Revolutionists had it out, during the pre-republican days in Japan. However, the debate was not whether or not we should have benevolent despotism but whether it should be had immediately or be preceded by revolution. The debate came to an end when the Ching dynasty fell, and in 1912 Mr. Liang owned that he was mistaken. Those who advocate immediate benevolent despotism today were at one time either revolutionists themselves or sympathizers of the revolutionary cause. Twenty years ago, democracy was the most attractive political ideal, but today dictatorship, another name for benevolent despotism, seems to have the biggest vogue. This is the change of our political creeds in the last twenty years.

Now, there are three types of dictatorship: 1. personal dictatorship; 2. party dictatorship; and 3. class dictatorship. I am against dictatorship of any brand. My reasons are three:

First, before we launch upon dictatorship, we must first ascertain whether or not we have one man, a party, or a class, who, as an individual or a party or a class, is fully qualified to be the dictator. "If the ruler could only appreciate how difficult his task it," says Confucius, "would not this appreciation alone be almost enough to start a state on the road to prosperity?" (爲君難……如知為君之難也，不幾乎—言與行乎？) But our proponents of dictatorship do not appreciate the fact that dictatorship or political tutelage is among the most complex and difficult achievements in the world. To be successful, he must be a born dictator, but he must be also a man of experience and with learning. However liberal we may be, we cannot yet find one dictator from among the militarists or politicians, nor can we find, say, 100,000 or 150,000 men from among our literates to form a personal, party, or class dictatorship for the no mean task of transforming 450 million people with our old concepts into a modern state.

Second, I do not believe it possible for us to find a magic formula with which the supporters of dictatorship may captivate the sentiment and reasoning faculty of the entire nation and rally the people to one leader, party, or class so as to make the dictatorship possible. But such a formula magical in power is absolutely necessary for dictatorship in the 20th century, as the history of Soviet Russia, new Turkey, fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany clearly shows. Even such a slogan as "National salvation through resistance to Japan" lost its appeal before the end of two years. If the nation can't rally to a cause of national salvation, can it rally to a leader?

Third and my last argument is that my observation of politics in the past few decades convinces me that democracy, an infantile political system, is most suitable as a drill for our people who are still lacking in political experience. Our observation of the working of the parliaments and local assemblies of different democratic countries tells us, that high praises of the worshippers of the democratic ideal notwithstanding, the system is childish to a degree. It has not attracted to it the best talents in the country. However, its strength lies in the fact that it works tolerably well without the unusually well gifted persons at its helm. It is the government of common sense, and not of the best talents which benevolent despotism requires. It may begin with a humble beginning, but is capable of gradual development and attainment. It will give us the best exercises in politics, both in governing and being governed. If we take to heart the lessons that the democratic countries in the west have for us, then after a few decades we may try a hand in the benevolent despotism.

Dictatorship As A Panacea

BY RANDALL GOULD

NATIONS are as subject to the lure of panaceas as any rural patent-medicine guzzler. The panacea—about which the flares are burning and the drums thumping at present is that of the national dictator, and it is no reason for surprise that China should be sidling up, dollar in hand, with intent to buy and be saved.

Now the panacea is a splendid idea. We all more or less secretly hug the notion that for any ill, there must be a single simple cure could we but find it. That is why women suffering from excess fat, indigestion, falling arches, blotched skin and pimples triumphantly pounce upon some new fangled powder which will fix everything in a jiffy, if mixed with the morning bath; and it is likewise why nations suffering from bloated
expenditure, malnutrition of the income, excess population, political graft, squandered national resources and capitalism run rampant fall gratefully back upon the panacea of dictatorship as a means of salvation.

Dictatorship is easy to understand, dramatic, and soothing to the ego. What more natural than that any citizen of any country (China certainly included) should sigh and say, "Well, many hands have made a mess of our nation, but if we can find one strong man, everything will soon be in apple-pie order again. Find the right man, give him full power, and watch everything come right!"

Intermittent for many years the search for this one strong man has proceeded in China. The "forcible unification" idea of General Wu Pei-fu was one phase of this search. None can guess how many modest violets like the late General Chang Tso-lin hugged to their bosoms the notion that they could move from victory to victory till all was gained and the nation was theirs. Yet neither the would-be strong men nor their backers have had any overpowering encouragement.

Today the demand for a strong man, a dictator, seems to come increasingly from the people themselves, in China and in other lands. This would seem, perhaps, to indicate that at last the dictator panacea was likely to get a thorough trial with every chance for its success.

Yet to me the dictator notion is just another notion, attractive but illusory. I see no merit in the true dictator and think China should prove probably the last place that he could work his will to any good effect. Perhaps I, as a foreigner in China, should not go too far in striving to read the Chinese character and genius for government (or should we say misgovernment?) yet the record seems reasonably clear in certain general aspects bearing directly upon this matter.

It is true that there should be at least one man of strong character at the heart of government, but that is a long remove from naming him dictator. The dictator imposes his will, and carries the seeds of his eventual downfall within, that very fact, unless he rules a people quite devoid of that individuality which is the very essence of the Chinese. The man of whom I speak is an administrator and coordinator, the captain of a team. President Roosevelt is the best present-day example one can bring to mind, and some have striven to depict him as a dictator, but he is not a dictator in any true sense.

What China needs, in my view, is someone approximating the type of President Roosevelt; which is to say that China needs a group of experts rather than a single opinionated individual.

The genius of the country runs in that direction and directly counter to the rise of a single powerful man imposing his desires upon a cowed nation, China, though not belligerent, does not cow. It is quiet but firm in its insistence upon an individuality which works out, in the not-very-long long run, to pull down everyone who strives to rise purely as a "strong man" or dictator type. The only question seems to be that of how far such a man gets; that he is foredoomed at last is implicit in the nature of the country.

Group rule with a large degree of local autonomy (which may, however, receive a great deal of direction from an enlightened and respected central source) is quite congenial to the spirit of the country, and in this China is not without some similarity to America.

Dictatorship implies an abnegation of the democratic spirit, and China seems to me—despite occasional evidence to the contrary, and the great handicap of widespread illiteracy—to be moving toward greater democracy constantly. The future of China lies in channels of democracy unless my guess is extremely poor. Perhaps this is not the ideal way, or the efficient way, but what we must consider is what China is and what is likely to happen in China, rather than the impossible fiddle-de-dees which have been mouthed by discontented foreigners in treaty ports for decades back.

This points a distinction likely to be lost in dispute concerning future events. We all tend to be carried away by what we should like to see, rather than what there is the slightest possibility that we may see.

China's past shortcomings have always been easy to perceive, and many of them were due to the disunifying factors of super-individuality and too much local autonomy, so it has been natural that the critics—especially the foreign critic—should find in the easy suggestion of an all-powerful dictatorship a handy panacea. They offered it, and if China were so obtuse as to pass up this helpful suggestion, why, so much the worse for ungrateful China. But while these offers were being made in the loftiest of spirits, no one seemed particularly concerned about the fact that would-be dictators were regularly stumbling and falling, and that nothing in the situation encouraged their theories.

As I have said, the thing which seems favored by Chinese characteristics, or those of any other democratically inclined people, is government by an enlightened and expert group headed by the most outstanding of their number. Nanking recognized this truth from the outset (or, rather, Dr. Sun Yat-sen recognized it) and despite the obvious failures of Nationalist efforts, the path which is now being followed is an essentially sound one, although we all grow impatient at the failure to follow ideals, the lack of full harmony, and above all the continued domination of military matters with overwhelming expenditures for military purposes.

The administration of China must, to be successful, be a thoroughly civilian administration, and insofar as any government of China is tinged with a military complex, just as far will that government find it impossible to fulfill its true destinies in my opinion.

But progress is being made, though in the matter of military domination and expenditure this progress is exasperatingly slow. Still, we see civil warfare put down, and even the high miracle of generals being prevented from their old-time commandeering of trains.
Mr. Chu Chao-Hsin

Mr. Chu was for many years Chargé d'affaires in London. Before that, he was Consul-General in San Francisco. From London he was promoted to Minister to Italy. From the latter place, he came back home, first as Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Canton, then concurrently as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs at Nanking. With the retreat from Hankow of the Kwangsi party, with which he was allied, he retired for a time to Nanyang. The last we heard of him was his dying in Canton, after eating snakes, in an entertainment given by him to some foreign friends. A strange death for a strange man.

Mr. Chu is comfortably stout. Whether he is a gourmet, we don't know, but he, at any rate, looks as if he is a gourmand. Of medium height, inclined to be ruddy in his complexion, with a face which suggests great satisfaction with himself and the world, Mr. Chu is a good instance of a moyen homme sensuel turned diplomat.

There are faces so sour that they suggest vinegar: looking at them makes one's nose wet with perspiration. Then again, there are faces so refined, so mature, and sparkling with well-bred bonhomie, that they bring to one's mind good old Burgundy. Mr. Chu's face conjures up beer — a kindly drink, bourgeois, common, "of widest commonalty spread," incapable of making one wild with frenzy or enthusiasm, but of marvellous potency in producing that state of dull numbness in the mind, when shame, truth, lies, justice, righteousness and honour lose all distinctions, and when earth and sky and past and present become blended together, tinged with that feeling of smug satisfaction with oneself, which Browning has expressed so well in Pippa Passes:

The year's at the spring
And day's at the morn;
Morning's at seven;
The hill-side's dew-pearled;
The lark's on the wing;
The snail's on the thorn;
God's in his heaven —
All's right with the world!

When one talks of diplomats, one usually thinks of cynical worldlings, immaculately dressed, full of subtle cunning at the Council board, scintillating with bon mots at social gatherings, irresistible to ladies, thoroughly insincere, but insincere in the grand style, charming with a seductiveness which deceives no one, brilliant as glass and just as brittle. Now Mr. Chu is none of these things. He is no dandy. He is not charming. He is not brilliant. He says the most commonplace things in the most commonplace way. He may be astute, but he never allows his astuteness to deviate into profundity. Imperturbably bland, not afraid of repeating the same old stale jokes for the hundredth time, constantly doing the wrong things at the right moment, Mr. Chu may not be a diplomat after one's own heart; but considering the impossible position of China in the years that Mr. Chu was representing her, must one not admit that nobody else would have done any better under the circumstances? It's all very well to poke fun at Mr. Chu's gaucheries at dinner-parties and at Geneva; but really, must those things be accounted sins against the Holy Ghost in a diplomat?

I like to think of Mr. Chu, the man. There is such a Rabelaisian inclusiveness in his likes and dislikes, that it's difficult not to have a soft spot for him. Mr. Chu is, in word and in deed, a democrat. I can't think it possible for him to turn up his nose at anything, and anybody. He is all affability to those who want his help. And to those who don't need his help, he is always kind. Most welcome is the heartiness with which he greets a person. He is not out to over-awe anybody. He puts on no side before the meanest of menials. For this reason, it would not surprise me to learn of some people despising Mr. Chu: but it would certainly grieve me much, if any one were to tell me he didn't like Mr. Chu.