Abridged on account of non-allegiance to the ruling party. The equality of opportunity must be co-existent and co-extensive with the equality of opportunity. The affiliation with a political party should be deemed as a privilege to serve the nation and not as a right to demand preference in political appointments for which only merit should be the main consideration and guide.

The popular consent to a dictatorship, moreover, is not to be accepted as a willingness to submit to an iron rule without qualification. It does not imply a supine attitude toward an imposition of a government policy which is designed to infringe upon the rudimentary rights of an average citizen. Dictatorship must in fact be looked upon as a mode of government which is far from being infallible and which consequently must yield to candid criticisms and be sensitive to public wishes. Dictatorship may stand for centralization, but it is by no means omnipotent. It may represent the will of the people but it cannot force its own upon them. Here one may pertinently invoke the classical maxim that "Heaven sees through the people and hears through the people," and it follows that a dictator as a benevolent ruler can claim no greater divine right.

If these simple rules of government are faithfully observed, one would neither object to the rule of a dictator nor doubt its chance of success. And if these self-same rules are observed, any government will succeed even without a dictator.

**Dictatorship vs. Democracy**

I. For Dictatorships

By Chiang Ting-fu (蔣廷黻)

Our country presents today—and indeed in the near future as well—a sorry spectacle, and we may not inappropriately quote the recent utterance of Mr. Hu Han-min "in the past two years the government has not done one thing worthy of praise." However, Mr. Hu is not quite fair, for the government did do many good things, only these are far outweighed by its faults. Further, this criticism may be levelled not only at the present government, in the last two years, but at the various administrations in the past two decades too. Since the establishment of the republic, the central government has always spent most of its financial resources for the upkeep of troops so as to maintain itself in power, hence it has not been able to carry out various desirable works, even if it should desire to do so. The situation was such that neither Yuan Shih-kai, nor Tuan Chi-chi, nor Wu Pei-fu, nor Chang Tso-lin could do anything, and the present government faces a similar situation.

Shall we have another revolution then? If not, then our talk, no matter how reasonable and sound, will lead us nowhere, because the government will simply pay no attention to what we say. If we should answer the question in the affirmative, let us pause for a moment and consider what our revolutions in the past have led us to, before we plunge headlong into another revolutionary campaign. Once in the field, we are bound to spend most of our energy and resources in fighting our opponents. Even if we should succeed in getting a foothold in one corner of the country, we shall have to maintain (and even increase if that is possible) an army, or we perish. This means that we have to tax the people under our rule to the limit and postpone what is good for them to a later date. And we have to take in allies too, if we are fortunate enough to find them. If we are successful in this respect, we shall soon find that the greater part of our "revolutionary army," no longer "revolutionary," and there will be mad scrambles for power and positions. In a word, the people will pay for the cost, but will not reap the benefit of our revolution.

And what a cost too! We tremble to think of it. Besides the loss of lives and property directly sustained by the people, there will be the bid for foreign help. Even Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whose purity of purpose is above suspicion, could not withstand the temptation of making a bid for foreign assistance. In his letter to Baron Okuma, dated May 11, 1914, he appealed to the Japanese statesman for help so that both the Chinese people and government may become friendly to Japan, and that "we may throw the entire China market open to Japanese industrialists and businessmen who will enjoy virtually monopolistic privileges." For "when China regains her tariff autonomy, a customs union shall be formed with Japan, and Japanese manufactured articles will come to China duty free, and so too will Chinese raw materials go to Japan." In another part of this letter Dr. Sun actually tried to show that Yuan Shih-kai was not sincere in his dealing with the Japanese. If Dr. Sun could stoop so low, what about others of more questionable integrity? And what is more, those in power were no less guilty. On August 19, 1914, Sun Pao-chi, the then minister of foreign affairs, sent to Lu Chung-yi, Chinese Minister at Tokyo, a cablegram, which said: inter alia, that "our government is trying to avoid any misunderstanding between Japan and China on some fundamental issues and also planning for an economic union" between the two countries. Four days later came this reply: "Please inform the president that Mr. Obata verbally informed me that Japanese government truly has the intention to stop the peace-disturbers. He also said that if China desires to see this intention translated into action, we have to state our terms. These terms must be advantageous to the Japanese so that we may deal with them effectively."

The end of such a race, if continued long enough, is clear to every one. Even assuming the purity of purpose.
on the part of the revolutionists. But who can guarantee us a revolutionary party that is really working for the good of the people and toward a prosperous and strong China? 80 to 90 per cent of the so-called revolutionists today are politicians who have failed, militarists with high ambitions, the unemployed literati, or common people on the point of starvation. It requires but little amount of imagination and reasoning power to predict rightly what these revolutionists can give to China.

However, such political phenomena are but natural when viewed in the light of European history. The incessant wars of roses did England no earthly good, and it was after nearly one century of despotism under the Tudors that England gained economic prosperity and emerged from a dynastic state a national state of the 16th century. Without passing through this stage of development, the Puritan revolution, a revolution in the real sense of the word, could not have taken place in the following century. Similarly, France passed through the intensive struggle between the Bourbons and the Guise which ended in the victory and despotism of the former. The Bourbons' contribution to France culminated in the reign of Louis XIV, when she became a national state. Without passing through such stages of development, the French revolution could not have taken place without the country falling into smaller states. The Russian revolution, too, received a legacy of three gifts from the Romanoff dynasty: first, Russia was transformed from a dynastic state into a national state in the three centuries of the Romanoff rule; secondly, the Russian court produced an intelligentsia class to run the communist government; and finally, the Tsars gave Russia no small amount of material progress, which enabled the "Reds" to withstand the assaults of the "Whites" with foreign aids. The moral is clear. We have not passed through despotism of the Tudor, the Bourbons or the Romanoff type yet, so we cannot have a genuine revolution.

Our heritage from the Manchus is no good as, so to speak, the capital for our revolution, for the following reasons. First, we are still a dynastic state and not a national state; we have loyalty to the family and one's native province, or place, but none to the state. Secondly, our despot did not bequeath us an intelligentsia to serve as the nucleus of the new regime; our monarchy is one which destroyed anything to hold the state together except loyalty to the emperor, so when the monarch is gone, we are like a sheet of sands which cannot stick together. Finally, the material side of our civilization lags too far behind that of other countries, and we can't resist foreigners fishing in our muddy waters. In a word, we have not built our national state yet, and we can't profit by any revolution.

We should, therefore, help the forces that work for the unity of the nation and remove all the germs that threaten to disrupt our national unity. Our problem at present is one of national existence and not a problem of which form of government we should have.

II. For Democracy

By Hu Shih

After carefully examining Mr. Chiang's arguments, we may raise the following three questions: (1) Is despotism necessary in building up a modern state? (2) Why did centuries of despotism in China fail to give us a national state? and (3) Must we pass through a stage of benevolent despotism before we can build up a new state?

1. Is Despotism Necessary in Building up a Modern State?—On this point there is a fundamental difference, as I see it, between Mr. Chiang's interpretation of history and mine. The historical periods of the three countries which Mr. Chiang refers to are, in my opinion, history of their national construction which covers a very wide field and is due to many causes other than the despotism mentioned by Mr. Chiang. Among the Tudors there were, to be sure, despots; but they were provocateurs of revolution rather than builders of a national state. Such benevolent despots as Henry VIII and Queen Elizabeth, did indeed help the formation of the national state. But the coming of the national state depended not on them alone, but on such causes as the art of printing, the influence of literature, the translation of the Bible, the Oxford and Cambridge universities, the economic prosperity of London, etc. Perhaps, what Mr. Chiang means is this: the centralization of power is necessary to the building up of a national state. But his use of the word "despotism" makes people think "dictatorship" is what he means. And it can be historically proved that the power of the English parliament greatly increased during this age of "despotism." For instance, the immunity of the members of the Parliament from arrest was established during the reign of Henry VIII. At any rate, it will be more accurate to say that centralization of power is one of the sine qua non in building up a national state, but this does not mean that we have to ape after the autocracy of the Romanoffs.

2. Why Did Centuries of Despotism in China Fail to Give Us a National State?—This is, I believe, a matter of difference in one's definition of the term "national state." In a sense, China cannot but be regarded as a national state, though unfortunately our unity and solidarity can hardly be compared with those of a modern national state. From the racial consciousness, from the one language, from the historical and cultural unity, from the one and continuous form of our governmental system—from all these, it is quite clear that our country has been a national state for tens of centuries. Although we were, at times, conquered by other races, yet in no other periods of history can our racial and national consciousness be more clearly seen. This racial consciousness always found expression in the liberation of our people under such national heroes as Liu Ju, Chu Yuan-chang, Hung Shih-chuan, and Sun Yat-sen. On the other hand, to what status have the Mongolians been reduced since the downfall of the Yuan dynasty? And have the loyal officials of