

The third sign of the emancipation of the modern Chinese girl is the suffrage movement which originated a few years ago. While universal suffrage is far from practical for women, or even for men for that matter, the spread of the movement gives the modern girl an added sense of responsibility—a responsibility practically unknown to women of the past—the responsibility toward the country, and not only toward the family itself.

The fourth sign of the emancipation of the modern Chinese girl is the annual dispatch of girl students to study abroad. No longer is the modern girl satisfied with the art of sewing and cooking. She demands an opportunity to train herself to be an equal with the man intellectually as well as in every other way. The result has been most gratifying. China today boasts many a woman leader in every walk of life.

The fifth sign of the emancipation of the modern Chinese girl is her increasing participation in the business and professional world. Thus we have modern women in banking, commercial and industrial enterprises and in legal and medical professions. In certain phases of business life Chinese women have proved to be more efficient than men.

The sixth sign of the emancipation of the modern Chinese girl comes after the establishment of the National Government in Nanking. Ten years ago one would hardly think of women in government, but today it is a reality. One of our leading jurists is a woman who has been admired not only in China but also abroad. The various departments of the Government are staffed with women. Their keen sense of detail is an asset which men envy but do not always acquire.

Thus we have the modern girl or woman in Y.W.C.A. movement, natural foot movement, suffrage movement, in business and profession, in government and in educational institutions. She represents the embodiment of the old virtues and the modern ideals. She need not be smart looking in order to be interesting; she need not be able to dance in order to be sociable; she need not be able to drive a car in order to be a "sport." In her one finds the modern ideals of a wife, the attributes of a companion, the qualities of a social leader and above all the characteristics of a worthy citizen of the country. She personifies all the freedom a woman is entitled to with a seriousness of purpose so lacking in the other members of her sex. She is the modern Chinese girl.

## Recent Chinese Colonization in Manchuria

By Quentin Pan (潘光旦)

In a preceding article (November 7, 1929) we have seen that Chinese colonization in Manchuria was at first confined to what is now the province of Liaoning. When it expanded, the direction of least resistance was to the east, into what is now Kirin. But when the Manchu Government made repeated efforts to clear Kirin of all Chinese settlers after 1776, the movement began to be deflected northeastward, thus making Changchun a new centre of expansion. The movement in this direction was greatly facilitated by the public sale of land in the eighteen twenties in the upper reaches of the Sungari. From thence, it may be reasonably assumed, the movement began to bifurcate and to spread far more freely than it had hitherto done. Eastward it entered Kirin, this time from the north-west, avoiding altogether the north eastern extension of the Willow Fence, the northern terminus of which occurred between Shulan and Yushu; and northward into Heilungkiang.

One Russian writes of this period: "In the 18th century, this process (of northward extension) was not very manifest, and its influence made itself felt only in the southern part of North Manchuria. In the 19th century it increased, especially in the period between 1820-1850, when the current had already reached Hulanchien, to the north of Harbin." Of the same period Huc wrote in his travels:—"You may now traverse Manchuria to the river Amour without being at all aware that you are not travelling in a province of China. The local coloring has become totally effaced." These words were perhaps a bit premature. Huc himself had never been in Manchuria; and we must not lose sight of what Mr. Pelliot once said

of Huc's writings: "On Chinese history in particular, no orientalist would ever dream of looking to the works of Huc for authoritative information."

But the Russian author's (probably I. A. Mihailoff's) statement, first quoted, cannot be far from the truth, for we definitely know that in 1860, Tëbzina, Commander of troops in Heilungkiang, presented a report "requesting official sanction for the emigration (from the Manchu point of view) of Chinese to Hulan, for the purpose of providing funds for the up-keep of the troops, by means of levying taxes on ploughed lands." This move brings out clearly that by the year 1860, the necessity for regulating Chinese colonization, so as to avoid further conflicts arising from leasehold relations between Chinese leaseholders and Manchu landlords, had been generally recognized. The request was answered in the affirmative, and about 4 million acres were granted for settlement; the size of the grant being of course in a measure indicative of the aggregate size of the immigrating communities. It will be remembered in this connection that the conclusion of the Treaties of Peking and Aigun about this time helped materially in bringing the request and the grant to pass.

But colonization on large scales presupposes good transportation facilities. These were of course lacking in those early days. Population movements then in the relative absence of external hindrances, were largely of a fortuitous character and so necessarily slow. During the middle years of the reign of Kang Hsi (around 1683) navigation in the Liao Ho, the Sungari and many

of their tributaries were greatly developed for the transportation of food into Kirin and Heilungkiang. For transport in the Sungari alone, there were 40 junks each holding over eight hundred bushels. But these facilities seemed to have influenced Chinese colonization only very directly and incidentally, as they were instituted entirely for the benefit of the Manchus who had not yet known agriculture. So seemed the first mail and military road built between Aigun, Mergan, Tsitsihar, Potune, and other cities in Kirin and Shengkiang finally to connect with roads of China proper. But the opening up of Yingkow or Newchwang as a treaty port in 1858 marked a turning point in the history of Chinese colonization. In earlier days, the sea route across the Gulf of Pechili proved sufficiently perilous for most settlers as not to have been much used. It was partly the precariousness of transporting food across the sea for the support of garrison forces that had led the first Ming emperor to institute colonization in 1380.

After Yingchow had been opened for trade, steamboats plying between Tientsin, cities on the north of Shantung promontory, and those of the Liaotung Peninsula, began to be common. That both trade and steam navigation must have proved a strong incentive to as well as a better means for more active migration to the North is evidenced in the marked increase of Chinese population in Manchuria around and after the year 1870. Not only were the surrounding regions of Mukden and Kirin becoming much more densely peopled, but areas north of the Yalu, around Hailung farther to the north, and in the vicinity of Harbin still farther to the north, were invaded by large numbers of colonists. It was further evidenced by the creation about the same time of three more prefectures; the prefecture of Changtu for Shengking, and those of Kirin and Changchun for Kirin. Twenty-one additional hsien were also created, eight for eastern Shengking to the north of the Yalu, and thirteen in Kirin, eight of which are watered by the upper reaches of the Sungari. But on the whole, it seems that the process of extending civil rule to these districts had been slow and inefficient; for as late as 1875, places like Tatungkou, West of Antung, were infested by bandits. The opening up of Heilungkiang was by the nature of the case slower. But before the expiration of the 19th century, Chinese settlers were to be found way up to the north and northeast; the only regions left untrampled were those close to the banks of the Ussuri and the Amur, and west of the Hingan Mountains, known as Hulunpeier, or Barga.

The opening up of North Manchuria has really a slightly different story to tell—a story which should have been earlier noted. Following the example set by the Russians, who had begun to build fortified posts north of the Amur, the Manchu Government proceeded to found cities south of it. Aigun was the first to be built (1684) which was followed by Mergan or Nunchiang (1686), Tsitsihar (1691), Hulanchien (1734 or even earlier), and Hailar. The city of Potune, already referred to in a preceding section, was built as early as 1692, al-

most a generation before it was caused to be included for a time in the province of Shengking. Potune, it may be further noted, later became the centre for the development of colonization in Mongolian territories to the west, part of these now being included as a northern extension of Liaoning Province since the Republic.

It will be difficult now to ascertain how much Chinese settlers as such contributed to the formation of these early cities, with the exception of Potune. In all probability, they did not contribute much. In those years, the only Chinese who were permitted to tread upon North Manchuria were members of the garrison forces or other soldiers commissioned on special occasions for the maintenance of peace and order in frontier districts, and also a small number of political and criminal convicts. It was some of their numbers who finally settled down, formed first rural communities.

These latter later became consolidated and began to take on urban aspects. This is probably the way the cities came into being. Such cities were not built, they grew; what was actually built and whose erection could be dated was the mud or wooden walls. We may agree with one of the authors of *North China and the Chinese Eastern Railway*, when he says: "There are reasons to assume that it is just this military element who became the first Chinese (non-Bannerman) farmers in the province of Heilungkiang."

Shortly after the expiration of the nineteenth century, however, another new factor, a new transportation facility, had appeared to help swell the ranks of Chinese colonists in North Manchuria. We refer of course to the Chinese Eastern Railway built 1898-1903. After 1858, when Yingkow was opened for trade, and especially after 1878, when all laws designed to disable Chinese colonization were repealed, the influx of Chinese settlers of course has experienced no interruption. But it has awaited the railway or railways to bring it to its present magnitude. The Russo-Japanese War unwittingly also helped to scatter the colonists more widely and further to the North.

That the stream of Chinese colonists into Manchuria has tremendously widened itself since the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway may be gathered from the following lines of facts:

In the first place, before the Manchus abdicated, they found it necessary to extend the area of orable land in Heilungkiang farther to the north-east of Hulan. An additional grant of over 4,000 sq. miles, including what is now the combined area of Wangkuehsien, Tungpeih sien and Hailunhsien.

In the second place, as the settlers have grown in number and cultivated land in area, agricultural produce must have grown in quantity. And this has actually been the case as is obvious from the following table

which, however, owing to many extraneous reasons, does not give as regular a showing as it should:

#### SHIPMENTS BY C. E. R. OF GRAIN IN 1000s. OF TONS

|           | Local | Export | Total |
|-----------|-------|--------|-------|
| 1903..... | 106   | 6      | 112   |
| 1904..... | 35    | 15     | 50    |
| 1905..... | 35    | 12     | 47    |
| 1906..... | 50    | 20     | 70    |
| 1907..... | 67    | 122    | 189   |
| 1908..... | 81    | 192    | 273   |
| 1909..... | 66    | 342    | 408   |
| 1910..... | 97    | 432    | 529   |
| 1911..... | 92    | 643    | 735   |
| 1912..... | 98    | 482    | 580   |
| 1913..... | 92    | 478    | 570   |
| 1914..... | 84    | 439    | 523   |
| 1915..... | 133   | 711    | 844   |
| 1916..... | 170   | 529    | 699   |
| 1917..... | 156   | 846    | 1,002 |
| 1918..... | 182   | 563    | 745   |
| 1919..... | 131   | 524    | 655   |
| 1920..... | 144   | 831    | 975   |
| 1921..... | 116   | 1,215  | 1,331 |
| 1922..... | 240   | 1,281  | 1,521 |
| 1923..... | 240   | 1,502  | 1,742 |

The third line of evidence may be sought in the rapid rate of population increase—a rate which mere natural increase cannot account for. The present population of Manchuria has been variously stated between 27,713,000 (The Research Office of the South Manchuria Railway, December 1927), 25,264,000 (Mr. H. P. Howard's weighted compilation from all sources, 1928) and 24,530,000 (Liaoning Provincial Government, July, 1928). When it is recalled that in the census of 1910, the total figure for the Three Eastern Provinces was 14,917,000, the rapidity of the increase is evident. Population in Manchuria has almost doubled in twenty years, whereas for China as a whole, the number of years required for doubling, according to the latest estimate, would be sixty to seventy.

When only Kirin and Heilungkiang are considered, the rate of increase will appear still more impressive. The Economic Bureau of the Chinese Eastern Railway estimated in 1924 the total population for both provinces to be 11,900,000, being bigger by 1,300,000 than that estimated by the Liaoning Provincial Government in 1928. Comparing 11,900,000 with the corrected estimate of 2,000,000 for the nineties of the last century, we see that the increase during the past 30 years has been about six times. "If we remember," says a Russian writer, "that during the last 25 years the population of Russian Far East (where Russian immigration has not been important), has grown approximately  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times, then the rapid growth of Manchuria's colonization will become apparent."

It will be noted that a part of the population that contribute to the impressiveness of the rate of increase are not permanent settlers. They are seasonal laborers and do not possess land themselves. They come largely from Shantung in the early spring and return in the fall when harvest is over.

In the last few years, we no longer need to rely much upon inferences and estimates. We are now in a position to know fairly accurately the number of new settlers or laborers coming in every year. The following figures were collected by Mr. Shinosaki, of the Oriental Development Company, for the years 1923-1928:

|           | Percentage remaining against those |                                 |          |
|-----------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------|
|           | Migrants entering Manchuria        | Migrants remaining in Manchuria | entering |
| 1923..... | 390,000                            | 105,000                         | 27       |
| 1924..... | 430,000                            | 196,000                         | 45       |
| 1925..... | 490,000                            | 275,000                         | 59       |
| 1926..... | 590,000                            | 293,000                         | 49       |
| 1927..... | 1,065,000                          | 748,000                         | 70       |
| 1928..... | 938,000                            | 544,000                         | 58       |
| Total...  | 3,903,000                          | 2,161,000                       | 54       |

From the above table, two things are at once evident. The first is that the number who are knocking at the door, be they seasonal laborers or bona fide settlers, have greatly increased during recent years, especially since 1927. The sudden rise was already observable in the fall of 1926, when "contrary to the tendency during the same season of any previous year, many hundred thousands of Chinese immigrants arrived and continued to enter in increasing numbers throughout 1927." The second is that not only increasingly more have been coming in, but increasingly more have stayed as permanent settlers, again especially since 1927. The following figures for those who landed in Dairen, where the records are believed to be better kept, bring out the comparison still more clearly:

|           | Migrants landing | Migrants leaving | Percentage leaving | Percentage remaining |
|-----------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 1922..... | 170,000          | 103,551          | 61                 | 39                   |
| 1923..... | 172,014          | 122,474          | 71                 | 29                   |
| 1924..... | 167,206          | 113,248          | 68                 | 32                   |
| 1925..... | 197,392          | 97,130           | 49                 | 51                   |
| 1926..... | 267,062          | 129,642          | 49                 | 51                   |
| 1927..... | 599,452          | 141,859          | 24                 | 76                   |

It has also been observed that before 1926, not many women and children disembarked at the different ports; but they increased quite considerably after that date. The following figures point to the correctness of the observation:

#### WOMEN AND CHILDREN LANDING AT DAIREN

| From      | Tsingtao | Chefoo | Lungkow | Tientsin | Other Cities | Total  |
|-----------|----------|--------|---------|----------|--------------|--------|
| 1925..... | 6,651    | 2,448  | 1,775   | 2,377    | 2,023        | 15,474 |
| 1926..... | 18,742   | 4,141  | 2,069   | 4,654    | 855          | 30,461 |
|           |          |        |         |          |              | 45,935 |

#### WOMEN AND CHILDREN LEAVING DAIREN

| For       | Tsingtao | Chefoo | Lungkow | Tientsin | Other Cities | Total  |
|-----------|----------|--------|---------|----------|--------------|--------|
| 1925..... | 2,903    | 1,017  | 785     | 334      | 865          | 6,002  |
| 1926..... | 2,966    | 1,631  | 1,003   | 815      | 496          | 7,011  |
|           |          |        |         |          |              | 13,013 |



Summarizing these figures and reducing them to percentages, we get

|           | Returning | Remaining |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1925..... | 39%       | 61%       |
| 1926..... | 23%       | 77%       |

As to the causal factors of Chinese colonization, the processes the colonists have to go through before

they arrive at their future homes, and the life they lead after having settled, we shall desist from discussing in any detail. All these aspects of Chinese colonization are undoubtedly of much sociological interest; and have been fairly fully treated by Mr. Walter Young in his "The Chinese Labor Migration to Manchuria." But for our present purpose, it suffices to know that Chinese colonization is becoming increasingly a fait accompli.

## Is the Abolition of Extraterritoriality in China Justifiable Today?

By C. H. Chu (朱啓勳)

The system of extraterritoriality in China is an abnormal one. By it is not meant the special rights to which diplomatic officers are entitled according to International Law. Extraterritoriality in China is, as Dr. Wellington Koo puts it, "legally constituted by two concurrent conditions; the exemption, partial or complete, of aliens from the territorial law and the application to them to the same extent, by their representative within the territory, of laws of their own country. Though this right has its roots in the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 with Russia wherein a grant of the right was provided on a reciprocal basis, the real origin of the present practice should, however, be attributed to the unilateral provision in the treaty concluded between Great Britain and China in 1843. Following in the footsteps of Great Britain, America and France secured the same rights in the next year. Other treaties which granted similar rights were concluded with the following Powers:

Norway and Sweden in 1847, March 20 (Arts. 21, 25, 29)  
 Germany in 1861, Sept. 2 (Arts. 34, 35, 38, 39)  
 Denmark in 1863, July 13 (Arts. 15, 16, 17)  
 Netherlands in 1863, Oct. 6 (Art. 6)  
 Spain in 1864, Oct. 10 (Arts. 12-14)  
 Russia in 1858, June 13 (Art. 7)  
 Belgium in 1865, Nov. 2 (Arts. 16, 19, 20)  
 Italy in 1866, Oct. 26 (Arts. 15, 16, 17)  
 Austria-Hungary in 1869, Sept. 2 (Arts. 38, 39, 40)  
 Peru in 1874, June 26 (Arts. 12-14)  
 Brazil in 1881, Oct. 3 (Arts. 9-11)  
 Portugal in 1887, Dec. 1 (Arts. 47, 48, 51)  
 Japan in 1896, July 21 (Arts. 20-22)  
 Congo Free State in 1898, July 1 (Art. 1)  
 Mexico in 1899, Dec. 14 (Arts. 13-5)  
 Sweden in 1908, July 2 (Art. 10)  
 Switzerland in 1918, June 13.

Under the extraterritorial system cases, civil and criminal, arising between nationals of the privileged states are subject to the jurisdiction of that particular state and tried by their consul. If the cases involve persons of different privileged states they are regulated by the treaties existing between those states without interference from China. In the dispute between a non-privileged state and a privileged state jurisdiction is assumed

by the consul of the nationality of the defendant; if he were a national of the non-privileged state the jurisdiction goes to the Chinese court; if he were a national of a privileged state the jurisdiction goes to the state concerned. If the parties involved are all non-privileged the jurisdiction lies wholly in the Chinese court. Jurisdiction also goes to the nationality of the defendant in cases between Chinese and nationals of privileged states. The jurisdiction lies wholly in the Chinese courts if the parties involved are Chinese or nationals of states enjoying no extrality. An assessor can be sent to a Chinese court by a privileged state in a case when the defendant is of the nationality of that state. The same privilege is given to the Chinese but in practice Chinese officials seldom if ever goes to sit in a consular court. With the exception of a few limitations set forth by treaty, international law and statutes, the rights apply extensively to all persons of the privileged states.

Such is the system existing today. Fifty or sixty years ago it might be tolerable, for then only a few Chinese ports were open to foreign trade and residence; but now there are more than one hundred ports opened to foreigners and their missionaries can even go into the interior; and in addition, the number of foreigners in China has been greatly increased. The system has not only proved to be unworkable but also unjust to the Chinese. No wonder during the last few decades the Chinese have been trying hard to abolish extraterritoriality. To their attempt the first response was given by Great Britain in the Mackay Treaty (1902) which provided that Great Britain would withdraw the right when China had a satisfactory judicial system. Japan and the United States made the same promise a year later and Sweden did the same in 1908. But the promises are as empty as they are indefinite. China also had availed herself of two opportunities in making a collective request. At the Paris Conference her request met the cold reply that the question was out of the scope of the Conference. In 1921 at the Washington Conference she succeeded in giving a better impression on the minds of the Powers who then agreed to send a commission to China to make an inquiry into the prevailing practice of the extraterritorial jurisdiction in China and into the laws, judicial system and the methods of administration of China.