do not always agree among themselves. The former course is obstructed by the lack of leadership, Premier Hayashi being unwilling to assume the presidency of the new party, and Prince Konoe having declined to accept such a post. Whether Mr. Koki Hirota will accept the offer remains to be seen. The two biggest political parties intend to make a constitutional issue of the election, while the objectives of the government's policy were said to consist of “1. A true manifestation of a national structure peculiar to Japan. 2. Replenishment of national defense. 3. Development of national resources.” Significant in this connection is the declaration of the war minister, General Gen Sugiyama, at a meeting of 600 army officers in active service and in the reserve, in which he, deploring the lack of appreciation of the present situation by the people, asserted the necessity of the army to further advance from its status of a “propelling force in promoting national fortunes” to that of a leader, and declared his service to be “aiming at the creation of a totalitarian state ‘devoted to national defense’”. The momentous question is whether the Japanese electorate will declare its confidence in the constitutional government or in a totalitarian state. The latter will greatly endanger the peace of the Far East. It is to be hoped that the Japanese people will choose wisely.

The Miaos, the Mongols and the Tibetans

REPORTS during the past week served to focus our attention on our relations with three peoples within the Chinese republic: the Miao, the Mongols and the Tibetans.

The revolt of the Miao in western Hunan arose from our rigorous policy of “civilizing” (i.e. Sificising) them, though nominally it is a protest against taxation. The old usage was to spend the tax collected from the Miao on the petty officials of these aborigines. When the present commissioner for the Miao affairs assumed office, however, he tried to divert the revenue to a better use, and he decided to spend the money on the education of the Miao children. This naturally aroused the ire of the petty Miao officials as it means a more restricted income for them. The new commissioner also appointed many Chinese as new officials. It was these two causes which made the Miao officials stir up the present trouble. Even before the present revolt broke out, the aborigines had been scared by their own officials of the central government's new monetary policy into hoarding coppers in caves. The tax that they refused to pay is a special levy to help support the soldier-colonists, a vestige of the past; and the reason given for the non-payment of such a tax is that the Miao people are too poor. Some of them undoubtly very poor, but many can, if they choose, pay it. Many Chinese officials, however, were either detained or murdered and the Miao region was reported to be in a state of anarchy. Nor does the situation improve by the delegation of power to General Tao Kwang, commander of the 29th army stationed in western Hunan, by the Hunan provincial government to settle the dispute as he sees fit. In fact, the trouble has spread from Yungsi, where it originated, to Fenghuang and Chiencheng, and now it is freely admitted that the trouble cannot be settled by force alone.

It is hoped in certain circles that Mr. Chen Chu-chen, the old commissioner, will come out to bear the burden once more, though he is believed to have no relish for rushing to a place where the angels are afraid to tread. Even if he should be finally induced to look after the Miao affairs, his old policy of letting the well enough alone will not suffice the present situation. There is no question that certain of the aboriginal customs must be changed, the feud between the different tribes, for instance, and that these tribesmen must be made conscious of their being part of a great nation facing difficult times and having their own contributions to make.

Many foreign critics blamed the Chinese government for playing its cards badly in Inner Mongolia, and they need but point out the defection of Prince Teh to prove their contention. However, it must be said that if China's "new deal" to the Mongolians has not been a crowning success, neither has it been a total failure. The very fact that the Mongols in Suiyuan loyally stood by the Chinese last year during the foreign invasion proves that the program of political autonomy for the Mongolians is something more tangible than a mere paper scheme, especially in view of the invaders' propaganda about establishing a great Mongolian empire.

Further progress has been revealed by Prince Sha in a press interview upon his arrival in Nanking from Suiyuan last week. He frankly asserted: "We Mongols know our shortcomings, and we are determined to push on our reconstruction program in line with the remarkable progress achieved in other parts of China." More particularly he mentioned the paochia (mutual guarantee) system, which has proved a success in the experimental areas and is shortly to be extended to all the Mongolian leagues and banners in Suiyuan. Prince Sha, too, revealed that good progress has been made in the extension of telegraph and postal services, in the promotion of river conservancy and afforestation, and largely in free education. Also the Shanhs and Suiyuan officials are promoting a 200-kilometer railway linking Kweihua, provincial capital of Suiyuan, and Sohsien in northern Shansi, which, when completed, will prove not only a great boom to the development of Suiyuan's business and agriculture, but also of great military importance. Beside the railway, the plan for two trunk lines of highways connecting the various districts of the province is being studied by road experts.

All this shows that after last year's resistance to the foreign invasion, the Mongolians and the Chinese have emerged not only victorious but also with a new realization of their common weal, and out of this realization a closer bond between them is born, which is bearing fruit. Let us carry on the cooperation to a successful end so that China will be unified and better able to resist any foreign invasion that may possibly be staged again by our aggressive neighbors.
While Suiyuan has been freed from foreign invasion, what remains of Sikong in Chinese hands is being threatened by a renewed invasion of the Tibetan troops. In Yushu, Chinghai, the return of the Panchen Lama is being held up by the opposition offered by the Dalai Lama’s subordinates in Lhasa. A deadlock seems to have been reached between the two parties over the question of the Panchen Lama’s bodyguards. If the spiritual head of Tibet should return to his native land without his armed retainers, he would be powerless before his former rival’s subordinates and may as well continue to remain a virtual exile from Tibet. Nor is he able to make a forcible entry to his homeland, for that would mean a civil war and a certain defeat for him. The Tibetan question before Nanking is, therefore, whether it is prepared to resort to armed force to settle the issue in Sikong or Chinghai. There is very little likelihood that Nanking, with graver problems demanding immediate attention, will launch an armed expedition against Tibet for the sake of setting up a pro-Chinese regime there under the Panchen Lama, while a renewed invasion of Sikong will probably be resisted as best the local troops could.

But whether we deal with the Miao, the Mongolians or the Tibetans, probably the best policy is, on the one hand, to make them realize that they have no small part to play in the destiny of the nation, of which they form an integral part, and to start in their land such economic and material reconstruction as is necessary, and on the other, to leave them alone, so far as their culture is concerned, especially those parts which are not incompatible with the national salvation. For to Sinicize them would invariably arouse their opposition, while by encouraging them to preserve and develop their own culture, our own culture will be enriched. Americans have tried their best to turn the remaining Red Indians into Yankees, and now American scholars are regretting what their forefathers and government officials have done. Let us not fall into the same error.

Four Views

LAST week four statesmen, two Chinese and two Japanese, stated their views on Sino-Japanese relations. From them may be seen the official attitudes of these two countries in their diplomatic relations.

Dr. Wang Chung-hui, China’s new foreign minister, speaking at the weekly memorial service at the central party headquarters, enunciated a succinct view of China’s attitude towards foreigners. Treating his subject from the historical point of view, Dr. Wang began:

Our country was among the earliest civilized; in our relations with the world, we made no distinction between what was Chinese and foreign; for, to our mind, “within the four seas all are brothers.” This attitude was proper, open and above-board.

After reviewing the liberal treatment China had accorded to foreigners, be they the Christian missionaries of the Tang dynasty, commercial travellers of the Marco Polo type during the reigns of the Mongol emperors, or the priest-scientists at the Ming court, he came to this conclusion:

We see therefore that in the past we always adopted a liberal attitude towards foreigners.

But unfortunately a change—gradual, it is true, but nevertheless a change—took place when the Manchus came into China and set up the Ching dynasty. In Dr. Wang’s own words:

At that time the Manchus did not hold foreigners in high esteem. Diplomatic documents were written in the form of edicts. After the Opium War in which China was defeated, this psychology of contempt changed to one of fear of foreigners. The officials in charge of foreign affairs, seized by fear, sought only to avoid offending the foreigners. Consequently, foreigners commenced their aggressions against us, with the result that the country gradually became weak.

From this, China’s new foreign minister drew a useful lesson—“It was certainly not right to despise foreigners, but it was worse to belittle ourselves”—a lesson which Dr. Sun Yat-sen must have learned long ago, so that his guiding principles for China’s foreign policy are “principles of equality and reciprocity, with a view to seeking mutual development with nations of the world.”

Taking this for the basic policy of the nation towards foreign countries, Dr. Wang brought it to bear upon the question of economic cooperation. To quote:

Of late, the international stage has resounded with talk of “economic assistance” and “economic cooperation.” However, assistance is mutual. Shackling other people’s hands and feet cannot be called assistance. Co-operation signifies union of two parties. One side alone cannot talk of cooperation. Looking after one’s own interests only is not cooperation but unilateral action.

We have quoted Dr. Wang at length and found him to be in entire agreement with the expressions found in the manifestos of the 2nd and 3rd plenary sessions of the 5th Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. Foreign ministers may come and foreign ministers may go, but the policy remains.

Moreover it is in line with the best tradition of the land. This certainly is worthy of the attention of the statesmen across the Yellow Sea. Furthermore the whole Chinese nation is behind such a policy. For without doubt Dr. Wang accurately expressed the sentiment of all thinking Chinese when he concluded his speech with the following sentences:

In order to elevate the status of a country, a determined struggle is indispensable. So long as we are determined to establish our country in the world, we need not fear falling in our task of consolidating the national defenses. The day will certainly arrive when we shall attain the status of freedom and equality for China as the late Party Leader aspiréd to.

Mr. Hsu Shih-yíng, Chinese ambassador to Tokyo, who recently came back to China to resign from his post because of advancing age, has been prevailed upon to retain it. And after being closeted with Foreign Minister Wang for an hour on Sino-Japanese relations and receiving an official call from Mr. S. Kawagoe, Japanese ambassador to China, Mr. Hsu gave an interview to Japanese pressmen in Nanking, in which he was quoted as saying:

To reach a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, it would be necessary, it seems to me, to remove all political obstacles first. This applies to the Sino-Japanese economic cooperation as well. We need, I believe, three essential mental attributes to help improve the Sino-Japanese relations: first, patience;